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In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, speculation arose that the Federal Reserve 
might respond by easing monetary policy. This paper uses a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model to investigate the appropriate monetary policy response to a natural 
disaster. We show that the standard Taylor (1993) rule response in models with and without 
nominal rigidities is to increase the nominal interest rate. That finding is unchanged when we 
consider the optimal policy response to a disaster. A nominal interest rate increase following a 




The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or its Board of Governors.   1 
I.  Introduction 
In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the U.S. Gulf coast with a catastrophic fury 
that caused unprecedented damage to the region. Burton and Hicks (2005) calculate that the total 
damage to homes, businesses, and infrastructure was more than $150 billion, making Katrina the 
costliest hurricane ever.
1 That estimate, in economic terms, represents about 0.4 percent of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s figure for total fixed capital and consumer durables at the end of 
2004. Economic activity in the Gulf coast region also was disrupted during and immediately after 
the hurricane. As a result, quarterly U.S. GDP growth is estimated to have declined by around 0.4 
percent in the third quarter of 2005.
2
                                                 
1 Estimates on the economic losses from Hurricane Katrina vary. Risk Management Solutions, for example, 
on September 9, 2005, estimated that insured losses were between $40 and $60 billion, while total 
economic losses exceeded $100 billion. 
2 A quarterly decline of 0.4% in U.S. third quarter GDP is based on estimates by the forecasting firms 
Macroeconomic Advisors and Global Insight. According to Cashell and Labonte (2005), Macroeconomic 
Advisors lowered their third quarter GDP annual growth forecast from 4.6% to 3.2% and their fourth 
quarter forecast from 3.6% to 3.3%. Insight lowered its forecast for annual GDP growth in the second half 
of 2005 by 0.7%.  Evaluating these magnitudes for a single quarter, at a non-annualized rate, suggests an 
impact on output of approximately 0.4%. 
 
The magnitude of the disaster fueled speculation by financial market participants that the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) might ease policy at its meeting of September 20 by 
postponing a widely expected 25 basis point increase in the federal funds rate. The change in 
expectations was widely reported by the financial press. For example, an article in the Cincinnati 
Post on September 7 stated that, “Before the hurricane … economists considered it a foregone 
conclusion that Fed policy makers would boost short-term interest rates by another quarter 
percentage point… Now, a growing number of economists say the odds are rising that the Fed 
might take a pass …”    2 
Data from federal funds futures markets also confirm this shift in expectations. Figure 1 
shows that the expected average funds rate for September and October began falling on the day 
after Katrina’s landfall. From August 29 to September 6, the expected rate derived from the 
September contract fell 5 basis points, while the expected funds rate for October fell by 11 basis 
points. 
At the September 20 meeting, the FOMC raised the federal funds rate by 25 basis points, 
as was widely expected before Katrina. The press release following the meeting stated that 
“While these unfortunate developments have increased uncertainty about near-term economic 
performance, it is the Committee’s view that they do not pose a more persistent threat” [FOMC 
(2005)].
3 Given the FOMC was expected to raise its funds rate target prior to Katrina, the 
Committee’s subsequent decision to follow that course of action indicate that monetary policy 
did not respond to the disaster.
4
                                                 
3 In his lone dissent, Governor Olsen recommended no change in the federal funds rate “pending the 
receipt of additional information on the economic effects resulting from the severe shock of Hurricane 
Katrina.” 
4 Although the FOMC did not respond directly to Hurricane Katrina, the Committee did take explicit action 
in the wake of a previous catastrophic event: the 9/11 attack.  The 9/11 event differed from other disasters 
in that it threatened to disrupt the efficient functioning of the financial system [Neely (2004)]. 
 
This paper uses a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to investigate 
how monetary policy should respond to catastrophic events such as Hurricane Katrina. We model 
infrequent catastrophic events using a two-state Markov switching process. Most of the time, the 
economy is in the non-disaster (or normal) state. In each period, however, a small probability 
exists that the economy will experience a disaster. A disaster is characterized by the destruction 
of a portion of the capital stock and a temporary negative technology shock that reduces output. 
We then analyze the impact of a disaster shock in model specifications with and without nominal 
price and wage rigidities.   3 
Our results indicate that the monetary authority should raise its nominal interest rate 
target following a disaster. This prescribed increase in the federal funds rate clearly runs contrary 
to the conventional wisdom following Hurricane Katrina. The press and financial markets based 
their beliefs on an assumption that the Federal Reserve is motivated to dampen the fall in output 
caused by a disaster. When conducting monetary policy within a Taylor (1993) rule framework, 
however, the nominal interest rate responds primarily to higher inflation rather than to lower 
output. This finding also holds when an explicit disaster variable enters the policy rule. Using 
optimal-control theory, as applied by Woodford (2002) and others, the monetary authority should 
strive to replicate the dynamics of a flexible price and wage equilibrium. Generating these 
dynamics requires an increase in the nominal interest rate in response to higher inflation—and 
also to the higher real interest rate associated with depletion of the capital stock. Such a policy 
minimizes real distortions due to nominal price and wage rigidities. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the model. Section III presents the 
specification of our disaster shock and its effects on the capital stock and output. Section IV 
examines the impact of a disaster when the Federal Reserve follows a standard Taylor rule. 
Section V analyzes the optimal monetary policy response to a disaster. Section VI concludes.  
II.  Model Framework 
We examine a fully articulated DSGE model where firms are monopolistically competitive 
producers of goods and households are monopolistically competitive suppliers of labor. Imperfect 
competition in the goods and labor markets enables us to consider models with price and nominal 
wage rigidities. Specifically, we consider three different specifications of our benchmark DSGE   4 
model: flexible prices and wages (“flexible model”), sticky prices and flexible wages (“sticky price 
model”), and sticky prices and sticky wages (“sticky price and wage model”).
5
Households are infinitely lived agents who maximize expected discounted utility over 
consumption, leisure, and real money balances. They hold money for liquidity purposes, trade 
bonds between themselves, invest in physical capital subject to Hayashi (1982) style adjustment 
costs, and participate in state-contingent securities markets. Each period, households supply 
differentiated labor services to firms in a monopolistically competitive market. Total labor supply 
then is calculated as a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) continuum of labor services provided by the 
households. Wage adjustment opportunities follow a Calvo (1983) specification. That is, the 
probability that a household can optimally adjust its nominal wage is ηw, while the probability 
that the nominal wage rises by only the steady-state inflation rate is (1 – ηw).
 
6
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Firms rent capital and labor services from the household sector to produce differentiated 
goods in a monopolistically competitive market according to a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Aggregate output comprises a Dixit and Stiglitz continuum of differentiated products 
and price adjustment follows a Calvo process. In each period, a random fraction, ηp, of firms can 
optimally adjust their price, while the remaining firms, (1 – ηp), can adjust only by the steady-
state inflation rate. 
Monetary policy is implemented by targeting the nominal interest rate, Rt. Specifically, 
the monetary authority uses a generalized Taylor rule: 
,                                        (1) 
where ^ denotes a variable’s log deviation from its steady state, yt is output, πt is the gross price 
inflation rate, ΔWt is the gross wage inflation rate, Dt is a “disaster shock,” and εt is a 
                                                 
5 Our model is a variant of the model analyzed in Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2009). 
6 Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) also use this specification.   5 
discretionary policy shock with a zero mean and variance of σε
2. Appendix A provides a more 
detailed description of the model. 
III.  The Disaster Shock 
We consider two crucial characteristics of a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina. First, 
a disaster destroys an economically relevant share of the economy’s productive capital stock. 
Second, a disaster temporarily disrupts production, which we model as a transitory negative 
technology shock. Since a disaster is an infrequent event, the disaster shock is modeled as a two-
state Markov switching process. The negative shocks to the capital stock and to technology are 
specified then as functions of the two-state disaster variable. 
    The disaster shock variable, Dt, can take on one of two states. State 1 is the “normal” or 
“non-disaster” state, while state 2 is defined as a “disaster.” The two states evolve according to a 
transition matrix with the following calibrated probabilities: 
,
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t ij D D D D prob p = = = −  For the given probability values, there is a 2% 
probability a disaster will occur, regardless of the disaster variable’s state in the previous period. 
  The disaster shock affects both the level of technology and the capital stock. First, technology 
is an economy-wide factor that enters each firm’s Cobb-Douglas production function 
multiplicatively. The overall technology shock, Zt, comprises the typical technology shock, zt, 
that follows a first-order autoregressive process and an additional component related to the  
disaster variable’s state:  
). ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
t t t D z Z ζ + =                                                             (4) 
Second, the disaster shock directly influences the accumulated capital stock. The timing of the   6 
disaster shock is important. In period t–1, the nondepreciated capital, (1 – δ)kt-1, and new 
investment, it, are combined to get the amount of capital,  , t k′  carried into period t: 
, ) 1 ( 1 t t t t AC k i k − − + = ′+ δ                                                   (5) 
where ACt represents a capital adjustment cost.
7
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t t t D k k κ − ′ =
 A disaster, if it occurs, then will be realized at 
the beginning of period t, destroying a portion of the previously accumulated capital. The 
remaining capital available for production in period t is 
                                                         (6) 
This regime-shifting framework is mapped into the canonical difference-equations structure of 
the model by log-linearizing the Markov-switching process. Details of the derivation are 
described in Appendix B. 
IV.  Simulation Experiments 
A.  Calibration 
The disaster shock variable is calibrated to reflect the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina’s 
economic impact. First, the ratio D
2/D
1 is set to 1.004, providing a baseline magnitude for the 
shock’s impact. The effect of  t D ˆ  on capital and technology are calibrated to generate specific 
impulse responses consistent with the impact of Hurricane Katrina. In particular, the disaster 
variable’s effect on the capital stock and technology are calibrated such that both the capital 
stock and output decline by 0.4% in the flexible price and wage equilibrium when the economy is 
in the “disaster” state. In terms of equations (4) and (6), this requires that we set 
t t D D ˆ 606 . 0 ) ˆ ( − = ζ  and  t t D D ˆ ) ˆ ( = κ . 
                                                 
7 The specific functional form of the capital adjustment costs is outlined in Appendix A.   7 
The existence or absence of nominal price and wage rigidities depends on the calibration 
of the probability of price adjustment, ηp, and the probability of wage adjustment, ηW. The 
probability of price adjustment equals 1 when prices are flexible and 0.25 when prices are sticky. 
Our calibration for the sticky price specification indicates that firms reset their price, on average, 
once per year, which is consistent with findings in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). The 
probability of wage adjustment is set to 1 if wages are flexible and 0.25 if wages are sticky. The 
sticky wage calibration, which is consistent with Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), suggests 
that nominal wage readjustment occurs, on average, once every year. Appendix A details the 
calibration of the model’s other parameters, except the parameters in the policy rules (which are 
discussed below). Table 1 summarizes the model’s calibrated parameters. 
B.  Taylor Rule Responses 
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of a disaster on the flexible model, sticky price model, and 
the sticky price and wage model when the central bank follows a Taylor rule with  5 . 1 = θπ  and 
125 . 0 = θy .
8
                                                 
8 This calibration of the response to output is the equivalent of a coefficient of 0.5 on annualized percent 
changes. In addition, the coefficients on the gross wage inflation rate and the disaster shock are set to zero. 
 We calibrate the shock to deliver a 0.4% fall in output for the flexible model. The 
negative shock to the capital stock and productivity factor prompts firms to lower their output 
and raise prices. That decline in output and rise in inflation is moderated when prices are sticky 
because some firms cannot optimally reset their price. To compensate for lost productivity and a 
lower capital stock, the non price-adjusting firms must increase their labor to maintain their 
production levels. Conversely, price adjusting firms reduce their labor demand as output falls. As 
a result, employment increases in the sticky price model and sticky price and wage model, but 
decreases in the flexible model.   8 
The larger output decline in the flexible model lowers household income giving them 
fewer resources to invest in capital than in the price stickiness models. In the period after the 
disaster, the return of productivity to its pre-disaster level permits firms to increase output, which 
lifts households’ income and enables them to increase their investment in physical capital. That 
process continues for a number of periods as the capital stock is slowly reconstructed. In the 
longer term, the protracted rebuilding of the capital stock is associated with below-trend output 
and persistent, above-trend paths for employment, investment, and inflation.
9
Both components of the disaster shock—the destruction of the capital stock and the 
temporary decline in technology—affect key economic variables after such a shock. Table 2 
decomposes the contemporaneous impact of a disaster shock on output, inflation, and the 
 
The endogenous response of monetary policy to inflation and output, via the Taylor rule, 
drives the movements in the nominal interest rate. The policy reaction to higher inflation after a 
disaster puts upward pressure on the nominal interest rate, while the decline in output generates 
downward pressure. In the standard Taylor rule calibration, the inflation rate effect dominates, so 
that an increase in the nominal interest rate is the prescribed monetary policy response. The 
initial increase in the nominal interest rate is over 80 basis points in the flexible model, while it 
rises only by about 30 basis points in the sticky price model and the sticky price and wage model. 
Destruction of the capital stock also increases future capital rental rates, which causes the 
equilibrium real interest rate to rise. The real interest rate rises initially by around 50 basis points 
in the flexible model, but only by about 20 basis points in the models with nominal rigidities. 
Finally, the gradual reconstruction of the capital stock keeps inflation and inflation expectations 
above their steady states for an extended period of time in all of the models. 
                                                 
9 These longer-term effects distinguish our disaster shock from a simple, transitory technology shock. The 
persistent increase in inflation is one property of the Taylor rule policy that indicates its suboptimality.   9 
nominal interest rate into the two separate components on the models in Figure 2. Immediately 
following the disaster shock, the temporary reduction in technology amplifies the decline in 
output and the rise in inflation and the nominal interest rate caused by the destruction to the 
capital shock. In subsequent periods, the persistent responses of the variables shown in Figure 2 
are entirely attributable to the gradual rebuilding of the capital stock. 
To evaluate the optimality of policy rules, we make use of Woodford’s (2002) finding 
that an optimal monetary policy replicates the efficient level of output.
10 The introduction of 
monopolistic competition in our model creates an inefficiency wedge between the efficient level 
of output and the flexible price and wage level of output.
11 Those markup distortions, however, 
are nonstochastic, so that wedge remains constant. In particular, our disaster shock—which 
produces a temporary decline in technology and a loss of capital—has no effect on the wedge. 
Accordingly, the optimal monetary policy response to a disaster shock is closely approximated by 
the output dynamics of the flexible model.
12
The specifications of the Taylor rule considered in the previous section fail to generate 
 Using this criterion, the dynamics illustrated in 
Figure 2 show that this calibration of the Taylor rule is suboptimal in the presence of nominal 
distortions. An optimal monetary policy should enable output to reach its flexible price and wage 
equilibrium. 
V.  Optimal Monetary Policy 
                                                 
10 Kim and Henderson (2005) also analytically derive this result in a model with one-period price and wage 
contracts. 
11 The efficient level of output occurs when the economy has no nominal rigidities and no distortions due to 
market power or taxes. 
12 Smets and Wouters (2003) also use this criterion for evaluating optimal monetary policy. It should be 
noted that this criterion identifies “optimal” policy as that which eliminates the distortions due to sticky 
prices. It does not address the welfare costs of inflation (area under the money demand curve) and the 
inefficiency of monopolistically competitive pricing, which remain even in the flexible price equilibrium. 
   10 
the optimal monetary policy response to a disaster shock, and a discretionary departure from the 
Taylor rule can worsen the outcome from a welfare perspective. In this section, we consider 
systematic optimal monetary policy rules as derived in the literature and evaluate their 
implications for our disaster-shock model. Because such policy rules may not be feasible in 
practice, we also consider a constrained-optimal monetary policy in which the monetary authority 
responds directly to the disaster shock. 
A.  An Example of Optimal Monetary Policy 
The optimal monetary policy rule depends on the source of nominal rigidities in the 
economy. Woodford (2002) argues that stabilizing the price level is the optimal monetary policy 
when prices are sticky. In a Taylor rule setting, that finding indicates that the parameter on 
inflation, , π θ  should be set to an extremely high value. Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) find 
that it is optimal for the monetary authority to target the wage inflation rate when wages are 
sticky. That is, the monetary authority should place a large weight on the wage inflation 
parameter,  , W θ  in the Taylor rule. In a sticky price and wage model, however, neither extreme 
monetary policy rule will suffice. A monetary policy rule vigorously targeting price inflation 
eliminates the effects of the price distortion but the wage rigidity remains. When wage inflation 
is the target of monetary policy, the effects of the wage distortion are removed from the model, 
but the impact of price stickiness remains. 
The impact of a disaster shock when the monetary authority follows an extreme price-
inflation control policy ( 000 , 10 = θπ ) is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 3. When the monetary 
authority aggressively responds to price inflation, monetary policy effectively prevents price 
inflation from changing, which eliminates distortions due to the price rigidity. That policy is 
optimal for the sticky price model because it enables the model to generate precisely the same   11 
output response as the flexible model. Elimination of the price distortion also causes the sticky 
price and wage model to resemble a model with nominal wage rigidities. The reduction in output 
pushes down labor demand, which produces a decline in the real wage. Since price inflation is 
unchanged, the nominal wage inflation rate falls after a disaster shock in all of the models. 
Panel B of Figure 3 shows the effect of a disaster shock when the monetary authority 
pursues an extreme wage-inflation target  ). 000 , 10 ( = θW  By aggressively targeting the wage 
inflation rate, the monetary authority eliminates distortions caused by the nominal wage rigidity. 
Therefore, wage inflation is unchanged after a disaster shock in all three models. That policy 
causes the sticky price and wage model to resemble the sticky price model. Targeting wage 
inflation, however, is not optimal for either of the models with nominal rigidities because real 
output deviates from the flexible price and wage equilibrium. The lower real wage rate caused by 
lower labor demand combined with a monetary policy objective of maintaining a constant 
nominal wage rate forces price inflation to rise in all three models. 
A monetary policy that aggressively targets both price inflation and wage inflation fails to 
eliminate the effects of either price or wage distortions. Panel C of Figure 3 shows the impact of a 
disaster shock for a policy that targets both price and wage inflation. In all of the models, price 
inflation rises but wage inflation declines. The wage inflation decline is caused by a falling real 
wage rate that dominates the price inflation increase. In the Taylor rule, the downward pressure 
from wage inflation cancels out the upward pressure on the nominal interest rate from the rising 
price inflation rate. Since the effects of both nominal rigidities are still present, the output response 
is suboptimal in both the sticky price model and the sticky price and wage model. 
B.  Constrained-Optimal Policy Responses 
A monetary policy rule that vigorously responds to price or wage inflation fluctuations   12 
may be optimal in theory, but may not be feasible in practice. The impulse responses illustrated 
in Figure 3 require that the market participants believe the monetary authority will respond with 
“excessive force” to any price or wage deviations, so that prices or wages will never change. 
Assuming that such a policy is not feasible in practice, we consider an alternative strategy in 
which the monetary authority systematically and directly responds to a disaster shock in an 
otherwise standard Taylor rule. 
We begin by searching for the optimal monetary policy response to the disaster shock, 
, D θ  in a standard calibration of the Taylor rule ( , 5 . 1 = θπ , 125 . 0 = θ y  and  0 . 0 = θW ). Following 
Woodford (2002), the optimal policy response to a disaster shock in a model with nominal 
rigidities is the value of  D θ  that minimizes variation of output from its flexible price and wage 
equilibrium. Figure 4 displays a grid-search across a range of values for  , D θ  where a positive 
value for  D θ  implies an increase in the nominal interest rate target.
13
D θ
 In both models with 
nominal rigidities, the optimal value for   is positive, which suggests that the optimal 
conditional response to a disaster shock is a policy tightening. A comparison of the output 
responses in Figure 5 indicates that when  D θ  is set equal to its optimal value, the interest rate 
rises more than indicated by the Taylor rule alone, and the reduction in output more closely 
mirrors the flexible price and wage equilibrium. 
The optimal coefficient on the response of the nominal interest rate target to a disaster 
shock can be negative in some circumstances. Figure 3 shows that when the optimal policy rule 
for sticky prices is applied to the sticky price and wage model, output declines more in that 
model than in the flexible model. Such a response suggests that the optimal coefficient on the 
disaster shock parameter in the Taylor rule can be negative. 
                                                 
13 For each set of parameter values, the model is simulated 1000 times over a sample period of 160 quarters.   13 
Figure 6 illustrates an example of a plausible policy rule calibration ( , 0 . 5 = θπ , 0 . 0 = θ y  
and 0 . 0 = θW ) where the optimal value of  D θ  is found to be negative for the sticky price and 
wage model. In this case, the systematic response to price inflation in the policy rule now 
eliminates much of the distortion from the price stickiness. Inefficiencies from the nominal wage 
rigidity, however, remain in the sticky price and wage model. Eliminating that wage distortion 
requires an easing of monetary policy in direct response to a disaster shock (i.e.,  D θ  is negative). 
Figure 7 demonstrates that the output response to a disaster shock is much closer to the optimal 
output response from the flexible model when policy directly responds to the disaster shock. On 
the other hand, it also shows that the aggressive response of monetary policy to rising inflation 
still makes it optimal to raise the nominal interest rate target in response to a disaster shock. The 
direct response to the disaster ( D θ <0) only partly mitigates the increase in the nominal interest 
rate. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Once the damage from Hurricane Katrina became apparent, the media and financial 
markets speculated that the Federal Reserve might ease policy by delaying an expected 25-basis-
point increase in the federal funds rate. Three weeks later at its next meeting, however, the 
Federal Reserve decided to maintain its pre-Katrina policy stance and raise the federal funds rate 
by 25 basis points. This paper examines the appropriate monetary policy response to a natural 
disaster such as Hurricane Katrina. 
Our findings suggest that, in most circumstances, the monetary authority should increase 
its nominal interest rate target after a natural disaster that temporarily reduces productivity and 
destroys some capital stock. When monetary policy is conducted using a Taylor style rule, the 
higher inflation effect dominates the lower output effect such that the endogenous policy   14 
response to a disaster is a rise in the nominal interest rate. We then apply Woodford’s (2002) 
findings on optimal monetary policy to show that the optimal response to a disaster depends on 
the sources of nominal rigidities. Any direct easing after a disaster, nonetheless, is dominated by 
the need to tighten policy in response to higher inflation and to accommodate the increase in the 
real interest rate. Thus, the optimal monetary policy response to a natural disaster entails an 
increase in the nominal interest rate. 
The reaction of monetary policy to any recurring shock should be evaluated in terms of 
systematic responses to infrequent events, not as discretionary responses to random shocks. 
Individuals observe policy actions and form expectations about similar future events. These 
expectations must be endogenized within economic models in order to provide robust policy 
analysis. The findings from our disaster-scenario framework show that a rigorous model-based 
approach to policy analysis sometimes generates prescriptions that are at odds with the prevailing 
public opinion expressed in the popular press.   15 
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APPENDIX A:  Model Details 
This appendix outlines the detailed equations of our dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model with both sticky prices and sticky wages. Our model is similar in 
structure to that in Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2009), except that it includes a disaster shock. The 
calibrations needed to convert the price and wage stickiness into flexible specifications and the 
parameterization of the monetary policy rule are discussed in the text of the paper. Calibrated 
values for the remaining parameters are presented in Table 1. Once the system of equations is 
calibrated, the model is solved for its steady state parameter values; the model is linearized 
around that steady state; and the rational expectations solution is calculated using the 
methodology of King and Watson (1998, 2002).  
Households: Households supply differentiated labor services to the firms in a monopolistically 
competitive labor market. Total aggregate labor hours, nt, is calculated as a Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) continuum of labor hours, nt,h, supplied by each household,  : ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ h   
, ) (
















= ∫  
where –εw is the wage price elasticity of demand for household h’s labor services. Firms’ demand 
for household h’s labor services are calculated by minimizing labor costs subject to the equation 


















where Wh,t is the nominal wage rate of household h, and Wt is interpreted as the aggregate 
nominal wage rate:   18 
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  Households are infinitely lived agents who participate in state contingent securities markets. 
That assumption enables households to be homogenous with respect to consumption, investment, 
capital, money, and bonds. Household h values consumption, ct, and real money balances, 
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b c c  
Et is the conditional expectation at time t, and β is the discount factor. 
  Households own the capital stock, kt, and rent it to the firms. In each period, household h 
selects a level of investment, it, such that: 
, ) 1 ( ) / ( 1 t t t t t k k k i k δ − + φ = ′+  
where  1 + ′ t k  is amount capital carried into period t+1,  ) (⋅ φ represents a Hayashi (1982) form of 
capital adjustment costs and δ is the depreciation rate. The capital adjustment costs are the 
resources lost in the conversion of investment to capital,  , ) / ( t t i t k k i i φ −  and are an increasing 
and convex function of the steady state investment-to-capital ratio such that  0 ) ( > ⋅ φ  and 
. 0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ ′ φ  A disaster, if it strikes, occurs at the beginning of period t before production begins. 
The non-destroyed capital, kt, that is available for use in production is 
). ˆ ( 1 + − ′ = t t t D k k κ    19 
Household h begins a period with an initial stock of nominal money balances, Mt-1, and 
receives a payment, Rt-1Bt-1, from its nominal bond holdings, Bt-1, where Rt is the gross nominal 
interest rate. During the period, household h receives labor income, Wh,tnh,t, rental income from 
capital, Ptqtkt, dividends from the firms, Dt, a lump-sum transfer from the monetary authority, Tt, 
and a payment from the state contingent securities markets, Ah,t, where qt is the real rental rate of 
capital. Those funds then are used to finance consumption and investment purchases and end-of-
the-period bond, Bt, and money, Mt, holdings. The budget constraint for household h is 
represented as follows: 
. ) ( , 1 1 1 , , t h t t t t t t t t t h t h t t t t t A M T B R D k q P n W M i c P B + + + + + + = + + + − − −  
Finally, household h chooses a level of ct, it, kt, Bt, and Mt that maximizes its expected utility 
subject to its capital accumulation and budget constraint equations. 
Household h negotiates a wage contract that can remain in place for an unknown number 
of periods. The opportunity to renegotiate a wage contract follows a Calvo (1983) model of 
random adjustment. That is, ηw is the probability that household h can set a new nominal wage, 
W
*
t, and (1 – ηw) is the probability that its nominal wage can only increase by the steady state 
inflation rate, π. When a wage adjustment opportunity occurs, household h selects a nominal 
wage, W
*
t, which maximizes its utility given the firms’ demand for its labor:  
( ) ( ) ( )
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where (1 – ηw)
i is the probability that another wage adjustment opportunity will not take place in 
the next i periods. Finally, a value ηw equal to 1 implies that the nominal wage is perfectly 
flexible.    20 
Firms: Firms, which are owned by the households, produce differentiated goods in a 
monopolistically competitive market. Firm f hires labor, nf,t, and rents capital, kf,t, from the 
households to produce its output, yf,t, according to a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
, ) ( ) (
) 1 (
, , ,
α α − = t f t f t f n k y  
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Firm f then chooses the combination of labor and capital that minimizes its 
production costs,  , , , t f t t f t k q n w +  given its production function. Solving firm f’s cost 
minimization problem yields the following factor demand equations:  




− = t f t f t t k n q  
, ) / )( 1 ( / , ,
α α ψ t f t f t t t n k P W − =  
where ψt is the Lagrange multiplier on the cost minimization problem and is interpreted as the 
real marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. The marginal cost, ψt, is identical for 
all firms because every firm pays the same rental rates for capital and labor. 
Aggregate output, yt, is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) continuum of differentiated products: 
, ) (
















= ∫  
where –εp is the price elasticity of demand for good f. Cost minimization by households yields 


















where Pf,t is the price charged by firm f and Pt is a nonlinear price index: 
. ) (
















= ∫  
Each period, firm f also may have an opportunity to select a new price, Pf,t, for its product,   21 
yf,t. Firm price adjustment opportunities follow a Calvo (1983) model of random adjustment. 
That is, the probability a new price, P
*
t, can be set is ηp, and the probability the price only can 
adjust by the steady state inflation rate, π, is (1 – ηp). A price adjusting firm selects a price, P
*
t, 
that maximizes the discount value of its expected current and future profits subject to its factor 
demand and product demand equations:  
( ) ( )
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i is the households’ real value in period t of an additional unit of profits in period t+i, 
and (1 – ηp)
i is the probability that the firm will not have another price adjusting opportunity in the 
next i periods. Finally, prices are completely flexible in this specification when ηp equals 1.  
The Monetary Authority: The monetary authority utilizes a generalized Taylor (1993) rule:  
, ) / ln( ) / ln( ) / ln( ) / ln( ) / ln( ,t R t D t y t W t t D D y y W W R R ε θ θ θ π π θπ + + + ∆ ∆ + =  
where Rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the actual gross inflation rate,  t W ∆  is the gross 
nominal wage growth rate, Dt is the disaster shock variable, and  t R, ε  is a transitory monetary 
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APPENDIX B:  Log-Linear Approximation of the Disaster Shock 
In order to map the regime-shifting framework onto the canonical difference-equation 
structure of the model, a log-linearized version of the Markov-switching process is expressed in 
the following form
14
1 1 ˆ ˆ
+ + + = Dt t D t D D ε ρ
: 
.                                                         (B1) 
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The composite expressions weighting the two values of Dt in (B2) are the ergodic probabilities of 
being in each of the two states.  
When Dt is in state 1, its logarithmic deviation from the baseline steady state is  
)] ln( ) [ln(
2
1
) ln( ) ln( ˆ 2 1
22 11
11 1 1 D D
p p
p
D D D −
− −
−
= − ≡ ;                              (B3) 
and when Dt is in state 2, it is 
)] ln( ) [ln(
2
1
) ln( ) ln( ˆ 1 2
22 11
22 2 2 D D
p p
p
D D D −
− −
−
= − ≡ .                             (B4) 
A useful property of a two-state Markov-switching process is that the conditional probabilities 
implicit in the expectation term in (B1) can be represented as a first-order autoregressive process. 
Using (B3) and (B4) and the probability transition matrix, it is straightforward to show that the 
autoregressive coefficient defined as  t t t t D D D E ˆ / ) ˆ | ˆ ( 1 +  is independent of the present state and is 
                                                 
14 See Hamilton (1994, p. 684) for a detailed description of the AR(1) representation of the two-state 
Markov process. This procedure of linearizing a two-state Markov process also is used in Pakko (2005). 
   23 
equal to p11 + p22 – 1.
15 For the linearly approximated simulations, this expression defines the 
value for ρD.
16
. ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ
1 22 11 1 − − − − − = − = t t t t t Dt D p p D D E D ε
 The sequence of disturbances placed into the model is calculated as 
                                   (B5) 
                                                 
15 The expression p11 + p22 – 1 defines the stable eigenvalue of the probability transition matrix, P. 
 
16 Given our assumed values for the elements of the probability transition matrix, the implied 
autocorrelation coefficient equals zero in this application. 
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Table 2:  The Contemporaneous Impact of a Disaster Shock (Percent) 
       
Flexible Model  y  π (a.r.)  R (a.r) 
  Full Disaster Shock  -0.41  0.67  0.80 
  Capital Only (ζ = 0)  -0.10  0.14  0.15 
  Technology Only (κ = 0)  -0.30  0.53  0.65 
       
Sticky Price Model  y  π (a.r.)  R (a.r) 
  Full Disaster Shock  -0.16  0.25  0.30 
  Capital Only (ζ = 0)  -0.09  0.13  0.14 
  Technology Only (κ = 0)  -0.07  0.12  0.15 
       
Sticky Price and Wage Model  y  π (a.r.)  R (a.r) 
  Full Disaster Shock  -0.18  0.29  0.35 
  Capital Only (ζ = 0)  -0.13  0.20  0.23 
  Technology Only (κ = 0)  -0.05  0.10  0.12 
       
 
 
Parameter  Symbol  Value 
Depreciation rate  δ  0.025 
Discount factor  β  0.99 
Leisure utility parameter  σ1  0.33 
Consumption utility parameter  σ2  0.5 
Capital’s share of output  α  0.33 
Steady state gross quarterly inflation rate  π  1.005 
Steady state labor supply  n  0.3 
Price elasticity of demand   εp  6.0 
Wage elasticity of demand  εw  6.0 
Average capital adjustment costs parameter  ) (⋅ φ   i/k 
Marginal capital adjustment costs parameter  ) (⋅ ′ φ   1.0 
Elasticity of the i/k-ratio with respect to Tobin’s q  [ ]
1 ) ( / ) ( ) / (
− ⋅ ′ ⋅ ′ ′ = φ φ χ k i   -0.2   25 
  
Figure 1:  Reaction of Fed Funds Futures 
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Figure 3:  Fully Credible Price and Wage Inflation Control 
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Figure 5:  Taylor Rule with Direct Responses to Disaster Shock 
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* Parameter values:  θπ = 5.0, θy = 0 
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Figure 7:  Enhanced Response to Inflation with Direct Responses to Disaster Shock 
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* Parameter values:  θπ = 5.0, θy = 0 